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Little Britain? The Debate on
Britain’s Foreign and Defence Policy





Foreign and defence policy is not a central issue in British general elections and the 2015
general election campaign was no exception, with the issue being mentioned only at the
end of party manifestos and with few debates on the subject. Yet, whereas there usually is
much common ground between the policies of government and the Opposition, the 2015
debate was of a different kind. On the one hand, the Conservatives argued that David
Cameron’s government had pursued the same “grand strategy” as the one the UK had
pursued since the end of the Cold War, that Britain is still “punching above her weight”
on the world stage and one of the most powerful countries in Europe as well as the USA’s
strongest ally.  On the other hand, the Opposition agreed with many experts,  military
officials or foreign politicians who voiced their concerns in the media, to say that Britain
had seen a decline in its international role and influence during Cameron’s premiership.
The debate on Britain’s waning influence in the world is not a new one, but while it had
been somewhat settled at the beginning of Blair’s premiership, it has come back with a
vengeance when the UK failed to win the peace after its long interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The 2011 military intervention in Libya, which was overwhelmingly supported
by Parliament and the public, was not sufficient to erase doubts about the role of the
Armed  Forces  after  they  left  Afghanistan  and  they  underwent  deep  budgetary  cuts.
Besides, the Opposition embraced the public’s growing war-weary caution on the use of
force in an ever more complex international environment, especially when these actions
were not undertaken under a clear UNSC mandate.
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Thus this paper aims to examine the gap between David Cameron’s – and Ed Miliband’s –
speeches in which they stated their wish to see Britain continuing to play the role of a
great power, and the failing support for involvement in foreign operations.
The debate on whether to intervene, either in Libya or in Syria (against the Assad regime
or against ISIL), revolved around the questions of legality and legitimacy of such military
interventions.  The  arguments  put  forward  by  the  government  and  those  who  have
supported intervention from August 2013 will be contrasted with the arguments used by
Ed Miliband and MPs who have been more cautious about the use of force in order to
show their respective understanding of the role of the UK in the world and the limits of
British interventionism.
The gap between the image political leaders have of the country’s role in the world and
Britain’s actual commitments can also be explained by the cuts in the defence budget
made by the Coalition government. The debate on the need for further cuts and their
consequences on Britain’s military ambition will thus be explored.
Lastly, the consequences of the Conservatives’ victory on 7 May will open a new debate on
the need for an overarching national strategy that includes a clear definition of British
interests  and  takes  into  account  the  country’s  capacity  to  deal  with  new  threats,
especially from the Middle East. The kinds of domestic and international pressures that
are exercised on Britain will be analysed to offer some insight on the challenges the new
government will have to face.
 
The coalition government, Parliament, and the debate
on British military interventions
Britain’s role in the world has rarely been as debated inside the walls of Parliament as
during Cameron’s first term in office. The “royal prerogative” gives the Prime Minister vast
powers and the Westminster model  has long been used in foreign policy analyses to
explain why the issue is so rarely debated in the House of Commons and in the House of
Lords. However, building on James Strong’s article,1 I  argue that Parliament has been
given more power on foreign and defence policy in the last decade and that, under the
last government,  it  has  become  the  place  for  an  actual  debate  on  the  UK’s  foreign
interventions.  The Conservatives’  justification for the war in Libya and the proposed
interventions in Syria and against ISIL as well as the Opposition’s stance on each of these
issues are part of a pre-electoral debate in which the two main parties stated their vision
of Britain’s role in the world.
 
Parliamentary debates on Britain’s foreign and defence policy
Traditionally, the British Parliament has not had any role in decisions to use military
force as the Westminster model vests the responsibility to deploy armed forces in the
Prime Minister, who possesses the “royal prerogative”. Most of the foreign and defence
policy debates organised in the House of Commons are adjournment debates2, that allow
MPs to discuss policies but without voting on them, and Parliament spends but a very
limited amount of time discussing the issue, both because it is an issue that requires few
laws and because there is often a consensus between party leaders. Studies on foreign and
defence policy generally emphasise the bipartisan approach to the issue,3 although this
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apparent  cross-bench  consensus  sometimes  diverts  attention  from  deeper  tensions
between leaders and their own back-benchers. However, party discipline is such that MPs
most often remain loyal to the choices made by the government and authors dismiss
parliamentary  discussions,  be  they  intra-  or  inter-party,  as  irrelevant  in  the  policy-
making process.
However, since the March 2003 vote over the Iraq war, Parliament has played a greater
role, which gave rise to a renewed analysis of the policy-making process that underlines
the fact that a government necessarily has to negotiate in order to gather support for its
action, including in the field of foreign and defence policy. The “differentiated policy model”
4 thus challenges the traditional Westminster model and offers useful tools to explain the
changes made to the royal prerogative. This also led some authors to talk about a new
parliamentary prerogative, especially when analysing the power to take Britain to war.5
In March 2011, in the context of the war in Libya, William Hague, then Foreign Secretary,
committed to “enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on
military action”.6 Such a law failed to be adopted, but the new Cabinet Manual mentioned
the rise of  a convention giving the House of  Commons an opportunity to organise a
debate before troops are sent abroad. 7
The growing role of Parliament in the last decade has had a direct impact on the policy of
the Conservative-led coalition, and on the attitude of the Labour opposition between 2010
and 2015 as well as during the 2015 campaign. The arguments used during the debate on
the war in Libya and those that led Parliament to deny the Prime Minister authorisation
to send British armed forces to Syria can be contrasted to understand in what conditions
and for what reasons each party is ready to commit British troops to war.
 
Meeting the conditions for intervention: the 2011 war in Libya
The decision to go to war in Libya was justified by the need to save the lives of civil
protesters threatened by the violent repression of demonstrations by Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi. Following the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970
on 26 February 2011, France and Britain played a frontline role in the process that led to
the adoption on 17 March 2011 of UNSC Resolution 1973 that allowed the use of “all
necessary  means”  in order  to  protect  civilians  from Gaddafi’s  forces.8 The threat  of  a
massacre  in  Benghazi,  the  international  support  for  military  action  –  both  through
adoption of Resolution 1973 and the call for the implementation of a no-fly zone from the
Arab League – helped David Cameron and William Hague make the case for intervention
in Westminster. In order to get parliamentary support, they argued that Britain would
not take any unilateral action and was working with partners in order to obtain a clear
mandate, which would remove any doubt on the legality of the intervention. Ministers
also guaranteed that the government would not launch a military intervention without
seeking parliamentary approval.9 After resolution 1973 was adopted,  Britain launched
“Operation Ellamy” on 19 March 2011. Two days later in Parliament, Cameron made the
case for war, insisting on the moral need to protect innocent civilians and on the fact that
no ground troops would be sent to Libya,10 making it clear that “this [was] not another Iraq
.”11 MPs approved the motion by 557 votes to 13. However, the process that led to the
intervention in Libya being overwhelmingly approved by Parliament was soon to become
synonymous with a loss of  power on the part of  the Prime Minister,  and as another
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humanitarian crisis unfolded in the Middle East, the government was unable to make the
case for another war in the region.
 
The debate on interventions in Syria and against ISIL: the end of the
age of British interventionism?
A few months after Gaddafi was ousted from power and killed by rebels in Sirte, attention
focused on the ongoing civil war in Syria. But as the need for intervention was being
debated in the media,  William Hague made clear in June 2013 that neither arms nor
British forces would be sent to Syria without previous parliamentary approval.12 On 21
August, a chemical weapons attack on the suburbs of Damascus allowed Cameron to build
a clearer case against the Assad regime13 and the Prime Minister recalled Parliament
before the end of  the summer recess in order to organise a vote on military action.
However, Ed Miliband insisted on the fact that UN inspectors had not yet established
Assad’s  responsibility  for  the  attack,  and  that  he  therefore  could  not  support  the
government’s motion. Even after the PM said he would wait for the full report by UN
weapons  inspectors  before  seeking  approval  for  a  British  intervention,14 the  Labour
leader  chose  to  withdraw  his  support  for  the  government’s  motion,  which  was
subsequently defeated by 285 votes to 272 on 29 August 2013.  Contrary to what had
happened during the run-up to the war in Libya, MPs began to question the legality and
the  legitimacy  of  an  intervention  that  was  not  backed  by  the  UN  Security  Council.
Besides,  Cameron failed to convince his own MPs,  thirty of whom voted with Labour
(together  with  nine  Liberal  Democrats),  and  lost  control  of  his  foreign  policy  to
Parliament. 
The British decision not to commit troops led the USA to suspend its  move towards
intervention and allowed Russia to make a deal  with Assad requiring him to destroy
Syrian chemical weapons. At a national level, Cameron’s statement confirmed the birth of
a new constitutional convention that required Parliament to approve military action.15 It
also considerably shook the Conservatives’ confidence in their leader, even though the
party rebels confirmed they supported the PM on other social policies.16 Ed Miliband,
whose leadership had been heavily criticised during the summer, was praised by Labour
MPs  and the  media  for  his  commitment  to  international  law and diplomacy against
Cameron’s more hawkish behaviour.17. However, the Labour leader was also blamed for
the international consequences of the vote, with Britain losing its forefront role on the
international stage, especially after Cameron ruled out the possibility of another vote on
Syria.18 In the end, the aftermath of the vote seemed more negative than positive for Ed
Miliband’s leadership as concerns were voiced as to the kind of foreign policy a Labour
government would implement.19
One year later,  on 26 September 2014,  the House of Commons voted in favour of air
strikes against ISIL in Iraq by a vote of 524 to 43, thus launching the third operation in
Iraq  in  25  years.  There  being  no  UN mandate  authorising  intervention  against  ISIL,
Cameron managed to convince Miliband and the vast majority of MPs to support military
action by insisting on the fact that no ground troops would be sent to Iraq and that
British forces’ mission was to support the Iraqi government in its effort to free itself from
ISIL.20 However, in spite of ISIL being present both in Iraq and Syria, Cameron chose to
limit the scope of the motion to Iraq in order not to trigger opposition from Miliband and
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Labour MPs.21 Further military engagement would need a new vote in Parliament should
the government wish to intervene in Syria.
Thus, even though the new convention has not been enshrined in law, no government
will be able to launch a military intervention without prior parliamentary approval. This
might make intervention more difficult as the public – and the Commons – have become
more sceptical about the reasons for intervention. Ed Miliband has made it clear his party
would  support  no  intervention that  would  not  have  been previously  authorised  and
legitimised  by  a  UNSC  resolution.  Therefore  the  arguments  used  during  the
parliamentary debates on whether to intervene in Libya, Syria or against ISIL give a pre-
election campaign insight on the way the main parties and their leaders think about
British interventionism and the UK’s role in the world.
 
Britain in the world: what means for what ambitions?
By refusing to organise a second vote on a possible intervention in Syria after the Labour
party voted the first motion down, the Prime Minister hoped to put the responsibility for
non-intervention on the shoulders of those who had opposed him. However, Ed Miliband
insisted Labour would have supported intervention if it had been legitimised by a UNSC
resolution and accused the government of being responsible for Britain’s isolationism.
But in his attempt to re-establish the Conservative Party’s reputation as the “party of
defence”,  Cameron  argued  that  only  the  Conservatives  had  a  clear  plan  to  maintain
Britain’s international rank. The prospect of a Labour-SNP pact of government provided
the Conservatives with an opportunity to effectively use defence and more particularly
Trident renewal to open a debate on Labour’s ability to make reasonable choices for the
future of the country, an argument they also used when Cameron moved the debate back
on the economy.
 
Labour’s opposition to “small-minded isolationism”
Ed Miliband’s major speech on foreign policy was given on 24 April 2015. In that speech,
the  Labour  leader  accused  David  Cameron  of  having  led  a  policy  of  “small-minded
isolationism”:
David Cameron has presided over the biggest loss of influence for our country in a
generation. And that has happened because the government he leads has stepped
away from the world, rather than confidently towards it. It is an approach that has
shrunk our influence and weakened Britain.22
Miliband pointed out several occasions when Britain’s “isolation and waning influence” in
the world was made obvious.  First,  a  few weeks before the speech was made,  on 11
February 2015, Britain had been absent from the Minsk II summit that had gathered the
leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in order to agree on new measures to
solve the crisis in the Donbass region of Ukraine. The second example of Britain’s failure
under the Conservative-led government was Libya. Miliband accused the government of
misreading the situation on the ground before the intervention, and leaving Libya to its
own devices instead of helping the Libyans build a stable government after October 2011.
The  third  and  “most  important  cause  of  [Britain’s]  loss  of  influence”  is  the  ambivalent
discourse of the Conservatives on Britain’s future in the European Union. Without a clear
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commitment to staying in the EU, Britain’s influence would necessarily be diminished “
and our loss of influence in Europe leads to a further loss of influence in the world.”23
Ed Miliband’s  foreign policy  experience as  Leader  of  the  Opposition before  the  2015
elections had been limited and his positions unclear. Whereas his brother David had been
Foreign Secretary in Gordon Brown’s government, Ed had been in charge of Energy and
Climate  Change  which gave  him far  less  international  experience  and even after  he
became party leader, his flight record was far from outstanding24 and there were lasting
concerns about his vision for Britain in the world after his opposition to intervention in
Syria. However, his speech allowed him to state that he would support “genuine and hard-
headed multilateralism” and “international law” in case Britain should intervene. He also
insisted on the importance of working with EU and NATO partners to restore British
influence in international organisations and in the world. The Labour Manifesto insisted
in the same fashion on Britain’s “unique influence in the world” and Labour’s pledge to “take
a multilateral approach to global challenges.”25
Besides, Miliband linked defence policy with the rest of his economic pledges:
I  want  to  be  absolutely  clear  that  amongst  the  reasons  we  reject  the  extreme
spending  cuts  that  the  Conservative  Party  propose  is  that  they  would  be  truly
catastrophic for the future of our armed forces […] I am not going to sacrifice the
defence of  our country on an ideological  commitment to a significantly smaller
state.
The Labour manifesto made the same commitment to:
ensuring the UK has responsive,  high-tech Armed Forces, with the capability to
respond to emerging, interconnected threats,  in an unpredictable landscape. We
will  conduct  a  Strategic  Defence  and  Security  Review  in  the  first  year  of
government,  with  an  inclusive  national  debate  on  the  security  and  defence
challenges facing the country.26
The coalition government had proposed to hold a new SDSR every five years27 (a period
that was judged far more appropriate than the twelve years between the previous review
and the 2010 SDSR.28 The Labour Party agreed with the proposed timetable and was ready
to conduct the process immediately after the election. However, the manifesto insisted
that the review be both “fiscally responsible and strategically driven”, and not “Treasury-
driven” as the 2010 Review had been.
However,  Ed Miliband’s  effort  to convince voters  that  Cameron’s  government was to
blame for the UK’s loss of influence in the world did not really trigger the expected
debate  on  defence.  The  issue  became  more  central  in  the  campaign  when  Labour’s
expected alliance with the SNP raised doubts about the future of Trident.
 
Trident renewal and the campaign: party commitments and the
ambiguity of a Labour-SNP alliance
At the beginning of his time as Labour leader, Ed Miliband adopted a cautious approach to
Trident, saying that the UK needed “to look very carefully at whether renewing Trident is the
necessary or the right thing to do.”29 However, after the government published the Trident
Alternatives Review30 and confirmed the country’s commitment to Trident renewal,  the
Labour  Party  reaffirmed  its  commitment  to  Britain’s  nuclear  capability  and  the  last
pledge in the defence section of the Labour manifesto stated that the party “[remained]
committed  to  a  minimum,  credible,  independent  nuclear  capability,  delivered  through  a
Continuous At-Sea Deterrent.”31
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It is surprising that an issue on which the two main parties agree should become the
focus of public attention during the campaign, and the only defence-related issue to be
discussed at length in the media. Yet, as polls suggested Labour would be able to form a
government only if they agreed on some sort of coalition pact with the Scottish National
Party, Conservative senior figures suggested this would inevitably lead to Trident being
abandoned. Indeed, the SNP manifesto stated:
The SDSR must […] consider the advantages of a defence policy without weapons of
mass destruction and wasting £100bn renewing Trident. We will continue in our
principled opposition to nuclear weapons and believe that the UK should abandon
plans to renew the Trident nuclear missile system.32
Nicola Sturgeon made this measure a red line in any negotiation to form a coalition
government, thus confirming the SNP’s traditional opposition to what is often perceived
not only as a waste of money but also a typical example of the kind of policies London
imposes on the Scottish territory and people. The SNP’s fierce opposition to Trident led
many to wonder what the Labour Party would do in case it  had to form a coalition
government that included or partnered with Scottish nationalist MPs. The debate was
used by the SNP and the Labour Party to show their difference and convince voters that if
the SNP supported a minority Labour government, this did not mean that one party was
adopting all of the other party’s policies or that the two parties’ stances would be mixed
in order to reach a vague, middle of the road compromise. Yet however much Miliband
insisted  that  if  he  formed  a  government  with  the  support  of  the  SNP  he  would
nonetheless maintain Britain’s deterrent,  he failed to explain how a Labour-SNP deal
could lead to a stable and disciplined government. Douglas Alexander’s reaffirmed that “
Labour’s  commitment  to  continuous  at-sea  nuclear  deterrent  was  not  up  for  negotiation.”33
However, on the same day, Defence Minister Michael Fallon wrote that Ed Miliband was “
willing to stab the United Kingdom in the back to become Prime Minister” in the same way he
did his brother to gain the Labour leadership.34 The personal nature of the attack caused
some  stir,  including  among  Conservatives,  but  David  Cameron  supported  Fallon  and
repeated that the Labour party was “playing fast and loose with our security”. 35 Even when
Vernon Coaker, the Labour defence spokesman, argued that the Labour party was indeed
committed  to  Trident  renewal  and  asked  whether  the  Conservatives  would  support
Labour in a vote on the issue, Fallon replied that “the way to be absolutely sure about our
nuclear defence is to vote Conservative.”36
Thus  the  Conservatives’  response  to  Miliband mixed personal  attacks  on the  Labour
leader  with  worries  about  the  party’s  ability  to  effectively  undertake  the  necessary
measures to secure the future of the UK’s nuclear capability. Whereas there have been
very few – if any – past examples of a general election debate when defence became a
decisive issue, the 2015 campaign showed that a change in the parliamentary majority
could now have consequences on an issue that used to be characterised by continuity. The
Conservatives therefore insisted on the difficulties that the country could expect if  a
Labour-SNP  coalition  were  brought  to  power.  They  further  insisted  on  Labour’s
inconsistent defence policy plans as part of a wider attack on the economic unsoundness
and strategic ambiguity in Labour’s manifesto.
 
The Conservative Party: putting the economy first
Just  as  Lynton  Crosby,  the  Conservative  campaign  director,  kept  repeating  that  the
Conservatives were the only party to have a “long-term economic plan”, the party’s line of
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attack on defence was also the economy. The coalition government had prepared the 2010
National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR, which were published at the same time as the
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), and there were clear indications in the SDSR that
the government’s  main concern had been to  balance the book and that  the defence
budget was no exception.37 Former Defence Secretary Liam Fox adds that the coalition
government was often accused of having produced a “Treasury-driven” review but that it
was  the  only  solution to  tackle  the  deficit  in  public  expenditure  inherited from the
previous Labour government. The over-commitment was estimated at £38 billion but it
was even bigger than that according to Fox, who adds that many problems were made
worse by the bad governance of the MoD with no mechanism to say whether the targets
were right and whether they were achievable.38
The 2015 Conservative Manifesto insisted once more on the situation the government
inherited when they came to power in 2010:
Labour’s  Great  Recession  weakened Britain  on  the  world  stage.  They  left  a  £38
billion  black  hole  in  the  defence  budget,  went  12  years  without  conducting  a
Strategic Defence Review, and, at time, failed to provide our Armed Forces with the
equipment they needed in Afghanistan. They shut down over 30 British diplomatic
missions,  failed  to  plan  properly  for  Iraq’s  reconstruction,  ignored  trade  and
investment opportunities overseas, and neglected vital relationships.39
Labour’s  bad  management  had  made  cuts  in  the  defence  budget  necessary  and  had
threatened Britain’s  national  security as a whole.  On the contrary,  the Conservatives
pledged to “maintain a balanced defence budget” and provide the “equipment they need” to
the Armed Forces:
We  can  only  have  strong,  well-funded  Armed  Forces  by  continuing  to  build  a
stronger economy. We have the second largest defence budget in NATO and the
largest in the EU. We are meeting NATO’s two targets: that each country should
spend two per cent of its gross national income on defence, and of that spending 20
per cent should go on major equipment.40
Thus the Conservatives insisted they had made and would continue to make well-planned
investments  in defence capabilities.  However,  since the end of  the Cold War,  British
military interventions have all taken place within a coalition (NATO or US-led) and the
November  2010 Lancaster  House  Treaties  are  a  sign of  Britain’s  (and France’s)  ever-
growing  difficulty  maintaining  and  modernising  their  armed  forces  on  their  own.
Cooperation with other nations, France in particular, seems a necessary move if Britain is
to maintain her international rank, especially at a time when the “special relationship”
does not bring as much as it used to for Britain. Indeed, voters expect their country to
continue to exercise influence in the world and play the role of a bridge between the USA
and Europe.
 
The voters’ paradox: expecting Britain to do more with less
The 2015 party manifestos provide yet another proof that issues such as the economy,
taxes, health, crime and justice or education are more crucial to the electoral debate than
foreign and defence policy, which is relegated at the end of the documents. Yet, even if
foreign and defence policy was unlikely to become a decisive issue, polls suggest that
there is no consensus among Britons on the country’s role in the world. A major survey
was conducted by Chatham House and YouGov in July and August 2014 and published in
January 2015.41 It reveals that a majority of Britons support an ambitious foreign policy,
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with more than 60% of Britons saying that the country should aspire to be a “great power”
and  a  majority  saying  that  Britain  should  participate  in  peacekeeping  missions  and
should help maintain international security. However, Britons generally identify border
protection and counterterrorism as the most important international issues, and only
17% of the public say that it is a moral responsibility to support revolutions and uprisings
against dictators. Besides, while two-thirds of Liberal Democrats and half of Labour voters
say they support an ethical foreign policy, only one-third of Conservatives do. Thus, even
though Britons still have “great power expectations” for the UK in the world, they have
become more supportive of a defensive policy that aims to protect the nation’s borders
and homeland security.
Furthermore, in spite of the support for the UK’s leadership role and responsibilities in
the world, 60% of the public agree that “The UK is expected to do too much internationally
[and that it] should do less and others should do more”. Britons are divided on questions of
defence spending: 33% of the public would like defence spending to increase, 31% want to
keep spending at current levels and 22% would favour cuts. While Trident was not part of
the 2014-2015 survey, a 2013 survey shows that 32% of the electorate wanted to maintain
the Trident  nuclear weapons system,  34% wanted to find a  cheaper system and 20%
favoured scrapping Trident altogether.42 
Surveys thus reveal that Britons are not becoming isolationists, but they favour foreign
interventions that are meant to improve national security and which are in Britain’s
interest  rather  than humanitarian interventions  that  are  part  of  an “ethical” foreign
policy.  Besides,  more  Britons  would rather  have the government  spending the  same
amount or less on defence, thus putting politicians in a paradoxical situation where they
are  expected  to  satisfy  voters’  ambitious  vision  for  the  UK  while  continuing  to  cut
spending. The 2010 SDSR and NSS focused on the latter expectation and the election of a
Conservative government on 7 May 2015 is likely to lead the country towards another
“Treasury-led” strategy.
 
Britain’s foreign and defence policy after 7 May 2015
The newly-elected  Conservative  government  pledged to  put  the  economy first  while
maintaining a certain level of defence spending in order to continue to be able to face
international threats on Britain’s security. Thus the government faces several challenges
at the same time. At the domestic level, the government will have to deal with the need to
fulfil its pledge to continue to curb the deficit, while responding to voters’ “great power
expectations” for Britain. But the government is also under international pressure as the
USA and other European allies want the UK to continue to take its share of the burden by
spending a minimum of 2% of its GDP on defence. How the government plans to meet
these challenges will be detailed in the new NSS and SDSR to be published in the second
half of 2015, together with a new spending review.
 
The “triple lock” pledge on defence: NATO allies and the 2015
election
At the NATO Summit that took place in Wales on 4-5 September 2014, the UK government
encouraged all member states to meet the Organisation’s 2% target of GDP spending on
defence. However, even if, as Michael Fallon underlined in a campaign speech,43 Britain “
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[has] met and will this year again meet the 2 per cent target”, the chancellor, George Osborne,
announced as early as November 2014 that deeper cuts were to affect the army as he
needed to make more savings in order to meet his austerity targets.44 Spending plans and
growth projections put defence spending at an estimated 1.88% of GDP in 2015-16, thus
falling below the NATO 2% target for the first time. The chief of the defence staff, General
Sir Nick Houghton, expressed his worries and declared that further cuts in funding and in
the number of  troops could threaten the national  security and would jeopardise the
armed forces.45 Twenty-seven Conservative MPs, including former defence secretary Sir
Malcolm  Rifkind  and  Rory  Stewart,  the  chairman  of  the  Commons  Defence  Select
Committee, also called on the government to meet the NATO target, forcing a Commons
vote on the issue a few weeks before the election.46 But David Cameron is not being put
under pressure to meet the 2% target at home only. Indeed, during Cameron’s trip to the
USA in January 2015, President Obama insisted that the military alliance between the two
countries would be undermined if Britain did not take its share of the burden, and US
defence officials have intensely lobbied the British ambassador with the same message.47
Michael Fallon tried to reassure both voters and Britain’s allies with the promise of a “
triple lock” on defence:
First, we commit to increasing the defence equipment budget by at least 1 per cent
more than inflation, throughout the Parliament […]. Second, we commit to making
no further reductions in the size of our regular armed forces. Third, we commit to
modernising our independent nuclear deterrent […].48
However, neither Fallon nor Cameron made any formal commitment to spending 2% of
GDP on defence, whereas the government enshrined their commitment to spending 0.7%
of GDP on international aid in law, something Liam Fox found “hard to swallow”. How the
government will fulfil the “triple lock” pledge without spending 2% of GDP on defence is
unclear and given the Conservatives’ promise to continue fighting the deficit, the next
SDSR will prove a difficult process.
 
The 2015 NSS, SDSR and CSR: a missed opportunity to debate the
government’s choices
The end of operations in Afghanistan and the new challenges to Britain’s security, from
terrorism to Russia, require Britain to redefine its world vision and the role of its armed
forces. The 2010 SDSR and NSS had been conducted over a few months, which had given
rise to concerns about the speed of the process and the poor quality of the strategic
thinking that had guided those who were in charge of conducting it.49 Furthermore, in
order to build a clearer strategy for Britain and a coherent DSR, the Commons Defence
Committee recommended that the NSS process start earlier and be published ahead of the
CSR and SDSR.50 However,  a  few months before the general  election and six months
before the publication of the next NSS, no formal talks had been held and there were
concerns that if anything were done it would again be far too rushed to be out before the
next CSR.51 Besides, a rushed NSS and SDSR process will restrain the number of people –
academics, civil servants, politicians or members of the Armed Forces – consulted when
preparing the strategy, which might damage the quality of the process.52 In 2010, the
newly created National Security Council had been in charge of the process and there had
been  limited  consultation,  something  which  the  Defence  Committee  had  found  “
regrettable.”53 The Committee was particularly  concerned that,  because of  the lack of
consultation, the public would fail to understand the decisions made by the government,
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which would create a “sense of disconnection between the decisions of government and
the understanding of the people at large on defence issues.”54 By conducting another
speedy process, the newly re-elected Conservative government is likely to reinforce this
sense of disconnection, and deprive the country of a rare opportunity to debate Britain’s
foreign and defence policy. One conclusion that can be drawn from this is that in spite of
all the talks and pledges about maintaining Britain’s role in the world, the Conservatives
Party under Cameron did not see foreign and defence policy as a critical electoral issue or
a priority for the nation. This also reveals the deep consequences of the financial crisis
and ensuing austerity measures on Conservative politics. The Conservative Party had long
prided itself on being the “party of defence” that held an interventionist and militaristic
policy under Margaret Thatcher and criticised Labour’s inadequate funding of the armed
forces, but this tradition has given way to a more isolationist view that focuses on the
defence of the UK’s borders and territory, more in tune with voters’ war-weary attitude
after decades of foreign interventions.
 
Conclusion
The debate on Britain’s role in the world and the end of interventionism started before
the 2015 general election. Indeed, while Parliament used to play but a very limited role in
the policymaking process, the last decade has seen the evolution of the royal prerogative
and the emergence of a new parliamentary prerogative, which gave MPs the power to
approve the Prime Minister’s decision to intervene in Libya and deny him the right to
send  planes  to  Syria.  The  Opposition  focused  on  the  legality  and  legitimacy  of  the
proposed intervention in Syria, thus announcing the arguments that Ed Miliband later
used during the campaign to present his version of interventionism. However, the focus
of the campaign was on the country’s economic difficulties and their link with the United
Kingdom’s military and diplomatic decline. Both parties tried to woo voters by promising
to maintain Britain’s “world power” ambition while continuing to cut the budget deficit,
which would require efforts from all departments, including the MoD. The way the new
Conservative government fulfils its election pledges will depend on the new Strategy it is
expected to formulate at the end 2015.
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ABSTRACTS
This article aims to show that foreign and defence policy has played an unusual role in the debate
between the main parties in the 2015 general election. Whereas, in the “Westminster model”
tradition,  there  are  few  parliamentary  debates  on  the  issue,  the  consensus  on  foreign  and
defence  policy  has  gradually  disappeared,  and the  royal  prerogative  has  been replaced by  a
parliamentary prerogative, with Parliament deciding on the use of armed forces abroad. This
paper  examines  the  arguments  used  by  the  Conservative-led  coalition  government  and  the
Opposition about the conditions for interventions. The parliamentary debate is thus analysed as
a prelude to the electoral debate. The latter focused on the consequences of a possible change of
government, especially in case Labour had been led to form a government with the support of
the SNP. But even if the Conservatives traditionally define themselves as the “party of defence”,
it  is  argued  that  domestic  constraints,  especially  budgetary  constraints,  instead  of  a  clear
national strategy, now underpin Britain’s foreign and defence policy.
Cet article cherche à montrer que la politique étrangère et de défense a joué un rôle inhabituel
dans le débat entre les principaux partis lors des élections législatives britanniques de 2015. Alors
qu’elle  était  traditionnellement  l’objet  de  peu  de  débats  au  sein  du  Parlement,  la  politique
étrangère et de défense est de moins en moins consensuelle, et la prérogative royale a cédé la
place  à  une  nouvelle  prérogative  parlementaire  sur  la  question  du  déploiement  des  forces
armées. Cet article examine les arguments du gouvernement de coalition et ceux de l’opposition
concernant les conditions de tels déploiements, prélude au débat qui précéda l’élection du 7 mai
2015. Celui-ci s’est concentré sur les conséquences d’un potentiel changement de gouvernement,
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notamment si les Travaillistes étaient amenés à faire alliance avec le Scottish National Party.
Mais si les Conservateurs se définissent traditionnellement comme le « parti de la défense », les
contraintes,  notamment  budgétaires,  qui  pèsent  sur  le  gouvernement,  semblent  guider  une
politique dont la direction stratégique est désormais peu claire. 
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